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Abstract
This note examines how the second chance, when provided to a disadvantaged player,
can resolve the prisoner’s dilemma.
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Highlights:
 A second chance given to a disadvantaged player resolves the prisoner’s dilemma.
 Two effects of the second chance: making a cooperative action safer; making a
non-cooperative action less attractive.
1. Introduction
The prisoner’s dilemma game has been extended in various ways to resolve the
dilemma. Infinite repetition of the game combined with the trigger strategy (folk
theorem), incomplete information (Kreps et al., 1982), and taking fairness into account
(Rabin, 1993) are included in these extensions. This note presents another approach,
possibly the simplest: giving a second chance to a disadvantaged player. Kalai (1981)
provides a preplay negotiation procedure, which resolves the dilemma in a one-shot
game. The current paper shows that Kalai’s procedure can be substituted with the
goal-directed behavior of the “investigator” in our example.
2. The prisoner’s dilemma game with the second chance
Let us assume the payoff matrix given in Table 1. The story behind it is as usual:
the police investigate two suspects under arrest. The suspects committed a crime
together, but the available evidence is sufficient only for minor convictions. The
estimated penalties are 5 years in jail if both suspects confess, 2 years in jail if both
refuse to confess, and 1 year for one suspect and 10 years for the other, if the former
confesses while the latter refuses.
Table 1
2.1. An extensive form representation
Figure 1 shows an extensive form representation of the above matrix. The subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game is characterized by confessions from both suspects
(Confess, Confess) and Pareto inefficient outcomes (-5, -5).
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Figure 1
Now, suppose that the investigator in charge is well known to be a perfectionist, who
stubbornly seeks not just one, but all suspects’ confessions all the time; and that if one
suspect confesses, the investigator always provides a second chance to the other who
has refused to confess. The game tree is thus extended to the one in Figure 2, where the
red node and the yellow node are added as the second chances given to suspect A and
suspect B respectively.1
Figure 2
1 Note that, at the stage of the red and yellow nodes, it is rational for the investigator
to give a second chance, since it certainly leads to the suspect’s confession.
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Then, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Suppose that second chances are provided to disadvantaged players
in the extensive form prisoner’s dilemma game. Then, the subgame perfect equilibrium
becomes (Refuse, Refuse),2 and the pair of payoffs becomes (-2, -2), that is, Pareto
efficient one.
Thus, the investigator fails to obtain confessions.
2.2. Simultaneous action in the first stage
Let us consider a slightly modified case where these suspects make initial choices
simultaneously, and suppose that, after their choices have been made, a disadvantaged
suspect who has refused to confess is provided with a second chance, together with the
information of the other suspect’s confession. In this case, the payoff matrix evaluated
at the initial stage is given by Table 2.
Table 2
Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose that second chances are added to the simultaneous-move
prisoner’s dilemma game. Then, the pair of actions (Refuse, Refuse) is a weakly
dominant and trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
Thus, cooperative actions are very likely to happen.3
2 At the gray node, “Refuse” and “Confess” are indifferent choices to suspect B, and
anyway, suspect A chooses “Refuse” at the root node.
3 Wagner (1983) discusses the prisoner’s dilemma by using an example similar to ours,
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3. Conclusion
While many devices have been proposed for breaking the prisoner’s dilemma, the
simplest may be to give a second chance to the disadvantaged player placed in an
asymmetric payoff situation. Comparison between Table 1 and 2 sheds light on two
effects of the second chance. First, the second chance makes the choice of “Refuse” safer,
since a later revision becomes available when the other player chooses “Confess.”
Second, it makes the choice of “Confess” less attractive, since the other player can
change its action from “Refuse” to “Confess” later. The framework of the prisoner’s
dilemma with the second chance is expected to have a wide area of application.
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